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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Must a claim against a decedentfs estate sufficiently 
identify its basis and claimant in order to be considered a valid 
claim? 
2. Does failure to file a valid claim bar the claim? 
3. Was Kip Quinn's claim a valid claim for wrongful death on 
behalf of the heirs of Dawna W. Quinn? 
4. If not, were the Respondents precluded from filing suit 
for wrongful death and obtaining a wrongful death judgment against 
the Estate of Fenton Glade Quinn? 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-804(1)(a)(1975) (Text contained in addendum) 
Utah Code Ann, §78-11-7 (1953) (Text contained in addendum) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12 (1977) (Text contained in addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves purported errors by the lower court in 
allowing a wrongful death judgment against Defendants even though 
no claim for wrongful death was presented to the Estate of Fenton 
Glade Quinn. 
The Estate of Dawna W. Quinn filed a claim against the Estate 
of Fenton Glade Quinn for personal injury on or about August 30, 
1984. (R. 21-22.) The claim was disallowed, and on or about 
Jasnuary 8, 1985, Plaintiffs filed an action seeking damages for 
both personal injury to Mrs. Quinn's estate and wrongful death on 
behalf of the heirs. (R. 2-4.) 
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On or about March 12, 1985, Defendants filed a Motion to 
Dismiss on the grounds that no claim on behalf of Mrs. Quinn's 
heirs was ever made. (R. 8-10.) This motion was denied by Order 
dated June 24, 1985. (R. 53-54.) 
Plaintiffs subsequently obtained a judgment which included a 
substantial damage award for the losses suffered by the heirs of 
Mrs. Quinn. (R. 365-66.) 
Defendants timely filed their Notice of Appeal on March 11, 
1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Dawna W. Quinn died on or about May 24, 1984. Her son, Kip 
Quinn, was named as the Personal Representative of her estate. e^ 
filed a claim (hereinafter sometimes "Claim") for personal injury 
on behalf of the Estate of Dawna W. Quinn against the Estate of 
Fenton Glade Quinn, her deceased husband. (R. 21-22.) The Claim 
was made by Kip Quinn as Personal Representative of Dawna Quinnfs 
estate, not as one of her heirs and not as the representative of 
her heirs. 
The Claim was disallowed. On or about January 8, 1985, Kip 
Quinn filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. C85-165. (R. 2-4.) The 
Complaint sought damages for personal injury on behalf of Mrs. 
Quinnfs estate (for which damages the Claim had been properly 
filed) and also damages for wrongful death (for which no claim had 
been filed). 
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On or about March 12, 1985, c ouns e l for the Defendants f i l e d 
a motion to d i s m i s s t h e Compla in t , on the grounds t h a t no c la im 
for wrongful dea th had ever been p r e s e n t e d or f i l e d . (R. 8 -10 . ) 
Bv Order da t ed June 24, 1985, D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion to Dismiss was 
d e n i e d . (R. 5 3 - 5 4 . ) 
S u b s e q u e n t l y , P l a i n t i f f s r e c o v e r e d a Judgment a g a i n s t t h e 
E s t a t e of Fenton Glade Quinn which i nc luded s u b s t a n t i a l damaqes 
for economic l o s s and for t h e va lue of l o s s of s o c i e t y , l o v e , 
compan ionsh ip , a f f e c t i o n and p r o t e c t i o n ; a l l wrongful dea th 
damaaes for l o s s e s of t h e h e i r s . (R. 365-66 . ) 
A p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r Not ice of Appeal on March 1 1 , 1987. 
(R. 372-73 . ) On or about June 9 , 1987, A p p e l l a n t s r e c e i v e d Not ice 
from t h i s Court t h a t A p p e l l a n t s 1 Br ie f would be due J u l y 20, 
1987. By S t i p u l a t i o n between t h e p a r t i e s , e n t e r e d i n t o J u l y 10, 
1987, t he t ime for f i l i n g A p p e l l a n t s 1 Br ie f was ex tended to August 
19 , 1987 . By Order e n t e r e d by t h i s Court on August 19 , 1987, t h e 
t ime for f i l i n g A p p e l l a n t s 1 Br ie f was f u r t h e r ex tended to 
September 2, 1987. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. U t a h ' s P r o b a t e Code c o n t a i n s two s e c t i o n s p r e s c r i b i n g the 
t ime and manner for p r e sen tmen t of c l a i m s a g a i n s t a d e c e d e n t ' s 
e s t a t e . Those s e c t i o n s , Utah Code Ann. (1975) §§75-3-803 and 
7 5 - 3 - 8 0 4 , should be c o n s t r u e d as r e q u i r i n g each c la im t o 
s u f f i c i e n t l y i d e n t i f y both i t s b a s i s and i t s c l a i m a n t . The 
language of t h e s e c t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s , as wel l as a p p l i c a b l e c a s e 
law, o t h e r l e g a l a u t h o r i t i e s , and the purposes of the s t a t u t e in 
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question, all support this construction of Sections 803 and 804. 
A claim "sufficiently" identifies its basis when it is clear and 
unequivocal, fully informs the personal representative as to what 
exactly is claimed, and gives enough information to bar a 
subsequent claim or suit on the same claim. 
2. If a claim is invalid because of its insufficient 
identification of basis and claimant, it should be deemed the same 
as no filinq. Failure to file a valid clam bars the claim and 
destroys the underlying cause of action. This consequence is not 
averted by actual notice of the claim to the personal 
representative. 
3. Kip Quinn's claim failed to preserve a cause of action 
for wrongful death. Wrongful death and survival claims differ 
markedly from each other. Kip Quinn's claim was clearly a 
survival claim, not a wrongful death claim. 
4. The Judgment entered below included substantial damages 
for wrongful death, even though the claim filed was not for 
wrongful death. Where, as here, there is a material variance 
between the claim and the cause of action sued upon, the cause of 
action must be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I . IN ORDER TO BE CONSIDERED VALID, A CLAIM AGAINST A 
DECEDENT1 S ESTATE MUST SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFY ITS BASIS AND 
CLAIMANT. 
A. U t a h ' s a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e s r e q u i r e e v e r y v a l i d c l a i m t o 
i d e n t i f y i t s b a s i s and c l a i m a n t . 
P r e s e n t a t i o n of c l a i m s t o a d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e i s g o v e r n e d by 
s t a t u t e i n U t a h . The two g o v e r n i n g s t a t u t e s a r e Utah Code 
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Annotated (hereinafter "U.C.A.") 5S75-3-803 and 75-3-804 (1975). 
Section 803 provides that all claims are barred unless timely 
presented. Section 804 prescribes the manner of presentment of 
claims. 
Under Section 304, a claim may be presented to the personal 
representative of the decedent's estate, or it may be filed with 
the clerk of the court. In either case, however, the contents of 
each claim should include the following six elements: 
1. Basis of the claim; 
2. Name and address of the claimant; 
3. Amount claimed; 
4. If the claim is not yet, the date when it will become due; 
5. If the claim is contingent or unliquidated, the nature of 
the uncertainty; 
6. If the claim is secured, a description of the security. 
The last three elements are conditional. They are required 
only in certain circumstances. The statute clarifies their 
non-essential nature: 
Failure to describe correctly the security, the nature of any 
uncertainty, and the due date of a claim not yet due does not 
invalidate the presentation made. 
U.C.A. §75-3-804(1)(a)(emphasis added). 
This important sentence clearly divides the six elements 
listed above into two groups. The last three are specifically 
declared not essential to a valid claim, while the first three 
elements of Section 804 are impliedly identified, by their 
omission from the sentence, as essential to a valid claim. 
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A well established rule of statutory construction provides 
that the expression of one or more items of a class indicates 
an intent to exclude all items of the same class which are 
not expressed. 
Pima County v. Heinfeld, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (Ariz. 1982). 
The "class" of items in Section 804 consists of the six 
elements of a claim listed above. The statute's specific 
expression of three items in the class as non-essential to a valid 
claim implies that the three omitted items are essential to a 
valid claim. 
This construction of Section 304, requiring as a condition of 
validity that a claim identify its basis, claimant and amount, 
finds support in the first senence of the section: 
The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal 
representative a written statement of the claim indicating 
its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the 
amount claimed, or may file a written statement of the claim, 
in the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk of the court. 
U.C.A. §75-3-804(1)(a)(emphasis added). 
The underlined portion of the sentence iust auoted prescribes 
the minimum content required in every claim filed or presented in 
Utah. If the legislature had not intended these elements to be 
mandatory, it could either have left them out entirely or included 
them among the non-essential items identified in the last sentence 
of the same paragraph. Instead, the terms were used to modify the 
word "claim" immediately preceding them. 
In construing Section 804, this Court must assume that the 
underlined words were used and placed advisedly, Board of 
Education of Granite School District v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 
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1030, 1035 (Utah 1983), and must give effect to all the words 
used. Durfey v. Board of Education of Wayne County School 
District, 604 P.2d 480, £84 (Utah n979). 
The only reasonable construction of Section 804 which gives 
effect to all the words used in the section, is to require every 
claim, as a condition of validity, to indicate its basis, the name 
and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed. As shown 
below, case law and other authorities support this construction 
and provide a standard for determining whether a claim is valid or 
not. 
B. Case law and other authorities1 support requiring a valid 
claim to sufficiently identify its basis. 
In Tangren v. Snyder, 3 68 P.2d 711 (Utah 1962), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the statutory requirements of the contents 
of a claim were intended: 
. . . to make a claimant set forth his claim with such 
particularity that the executor or administrator in passing 
upon it would be fully advised as to just what was claimed. 
368 P,2d at 712 (emphasis added). 
In order to be "fully advised as to just what [is] claimed", 
the personal representative must, at a minimum, be able to 
distinguish the claim filed from other, similar claims which might 
potentially be filed. This concept was expressed as follows by a 
leading authority on probate law: 
The essentials are only that the claim advise the executor or 
administrator of the nature of the demand and the amount 
claimed, so as to enable him to act intelligently in the 
matter, and that it reveal enough and in such manner as to 
bar another action or claim upon the same demand. ' 
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Bancroft's Probate Practice (2nd Ed. 1950), Vol. 3 (hereinafter 
"Banc. Prob. Prac"), Section 805 (emphasis added). 
In Ellis v. Cauhauoe, 260 P. 2d 309 (Wyo. 1953), the rule is 
stated as follows: 
\A] statement presented to the executor shall be so clear and 
unambi QUOUS as to distinguish the claim with reasonable 
certainty from all other similar claims. 
Ellis, 260 P.2d at 310, quoting with approval from 34 C.J.S., 
Executors and Administrators, §417 (emphasis added). 
The cases and authorities cited above support the rule 
requiring a claim to identify its basis. Furthermore, they insist 
that a claim, to be valid, must be "clear and unambiguous", must 
"fully advise" the personal representative, and must "reveal 
enough to bar another action or claim upon the same demand". 
As will be shown below, the purposes of statutes requiring 
claims justify these minimum requirements. 
C. The purposes of Utah's applicable statutes would be 
advanced by requiring valid claims to sufficiently identify basis 
and claimant. 
A statute is to be construed in light of its intended 
purpose. Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 
1980). Section 804, in common with other statutes prescribing the 
content of claims, has the following general purposes: 
1. To protect the decedent's estate. See Schwarzschild v. 
3insse, 365 A. 2d 1195, 1198 (Conn. 1976); Nathanson v. Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County, 525 P.2d 687, 693-694 (Cal. 1974); 
2. To facilitate the speedy, safe and definitive settlement 
of estates. See Motley v. Battle, 368 So.2d 20, 22 (Ala. 1979); 
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3. To allow the oersonal representative to make an early 
appraisal of respective rights of interested persons and a prompt 
settlement of demands against the estate. See In Re Estate of 
Feuerhelm, 341 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Neb. 1983); and 
4. To bar claimants who are indifferent, careless or 
dilatory in their attitude. See In Re Clark's Estate, 432 P.2d 
495 (Nev. 1967). 
Requiring each claim to identify its basis with sufficient 
particularity promotes the purposes stated above. Such a 
requirement allows the personal representative to intelligently 
evaluate claims and thus protect the estate both from improper 
claims and from the expense of defending against proper claims. 
The requirement also facilitates the personal representative's 
efficiency and allows him to intelligently evaluate each claim and 
to determine whether to pay or reject it. 
The significance of such a requirement can be readily seen 
from the purposes outlined above. Without a minimum content 
requirement, the claims processed would be fraught with 
uncertainty and risk, leading inevitably to increased delay, 
expense and litigation. 
For the reasons set forth herein, Section 804 should be 
construed as requiring each claim, in order to be considered 
valid, to set forth its basis with sufficient particularity to 
satisfy the standard described in Subsection B above. For the 
same reasons, Section 804 should be construed as requiring each 
claim to set forth the name of the claimant. 
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II. FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A VALID CLAIM BARS THE CLAIM AND 
DESTROYS THE UNDERLYING CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. Filing an invalid claim is the same as not filing a claim. 
Utah's Probate Code reauires the personal representative to 
accept or reject every valid claim timely filed. U.C.A. 
§75-3-806. In order to pass upon claims, the personal 
representative must be able to deal intelligently with them, 
understand their basis, and be able to distinguish them from other 
potential claims. If the personal representative is unable to 
carry out his functions because the basis of the claim is 
insufficiently stated, he should not be required to pass upon the 
claim. In other words, filing a claim which is invalid because it 
is insufficiently described should have no more force or effect 
than not filing a claim at all. Banc. Prob. Prac. , §769. 
B. Failure to file a valid claim bars the claim and destroys 
the underlying cause of action. 
It is well established that failure to file a claim within 
the statutory period bars the claim forever. U.C.A. 575-3-803. 
In fact, failure to timely file a valid claim not only bars the 
claim, it also destroys the underlying right. Ray v. Rambaud, 438 
P.2d 752 (Ariz. 1968). Neither the probate court nor an appellate 
court has any further jurisdiction to reinstate a claim not 
properly and timely filed. In Re Plank's Estate, 509 P.2d 812 
(Colo. App. 1973). 
The consequences of failure to file are not mitigated by 
notice to the personal representative. In the case of Estate of 
Jones, 588 P.2d 960 (Kan. App. 1979), the claimant filed a 
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creditor's petition for administration of the decedent's estate. 
Therein, the claimant described its claim. 588 P.2d at 961. 
However, the claimant never filed a claim in the form provided by 
statute. I^d. The court held that the claimant's failure to file 
a valid claim barred its claim. L3. The court concluded its 
opinion with the following observation: 
Nor is it significant that the administrator had knowledge of 
the medical center's claim. The administrator's knowledge 
does not dispense with the necessity of filing a demand. 
Estate of Jones/ 588 P.2d at 963. 
Similarly, in Nathanson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County/ 525 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1974)/ the decedent's former wife 
timely filed a petition for family allowance and a request for 
special notice as a creditor of the estate. She then contended 
that since the personal representative received actual and timely 
notice of her claims and of her intention to prosecute them, she 
had a right to file alternative claims after the four-month period 
for filing claims had expired. 525 P.2d at 692. The Court, in 
rejecting this contention, stated: 
We find no meri t in p e t i t i o n e r ' s con ten t ion . . . . An 
examination of the purpose of the p e r t i n e n t s t a t u t e s . . . 
compels the r e j ec t i on of the t h e s i s that mere "no t i ce" on the 
par t of the executor or admin i s t ra to r of the claim or debt 
may c o n s t i t u t e a s u f f i c i e n t bas i s for the p re sen ta t ion or 
f i l i n g of an "amended" c r e d i t o r ' s claim a f t e r the exp i ra t ion 
of the s t a t u t o r y pe r iod . 
525 P.2d a t 693. 
A claim must be filed in order to preserve the claimant's 
cause of action. If the claim is invalid because it fails to 
sufficiently state its basis it may be rejected. An invalid claim 
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which is rejected does not preserve a cause of action. 
Furthermore, the claimant may not rely on notice to or knowledge 
of the personal representative to supply defects in an invalid 
claim. 
Til. THE CLAIM FILED BY KIP QUINN WAS NOT A VALID CLAIM FOR 
WRONGFUL DEATH. 
A. The claim filed by Kip Quinn was the only claim relied 
upon by Respondents. 
Kip Quinn, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dawna 
W. Quinn, timely filed a Claim for personal injury for and on 
behalf of the Estate of Dawna W. Quinn. A copy of the Claim is 
attached hereto in the Addendum. 
No other claims were filed by Kip Quinn. Furthermore, no 
claims were filed by or on behalf of the heirs of Dawna W. Quinn. 
Plaintiffs relied solely and exclusively upon the Claim in 
pursuing their action for personal injury and wrongful death 
damages against the Estate of Fenton Glade Quinn in District Court 
(R. at 8-10, 23-28). 
As will be shown below, Plaintiffs1 reliance on the Claim was 
misplaced. The Claim was not a valid claim for wrongful death. 
B. A claim for wrongful death differs substantially from a 
survival claim. 
Utah law provides by statute 4por both a wrongful death claim 
(U.C.A. §78-11-7 (1953)) and a separate and distinct claim for 
survival of the decedent's personal injury cause of action (U.C.A. 
§78-11-12 (1977)). The two claims differ markedly from each 
other . 
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A survival claim perpetuates the decedent's claim for 
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the tortfeaser. 
Kynaston v. United States, 717 F.2d 506, 509-511 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(construing U.C.A. §78-11-12); Accord, DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 
P.2d 479, 482 (Wyo. 1977); Greene v. Texeira, 505 P.2d. 1169, 1172 
(Haw. 1973). A wrongful death claim, however, does not seek 
compensation for the personal injuries suffered by the decedent; 
rather, it seeks damages for the losses suffered by the heirs of 
the decedent. Kynaston, 717 F.2d at 509; Herrera, 565 P.2d at 482. 
A survival claim is an asset of the estate, which must be 
pursued by the decedent's personal representative on behalf of the 
estate, not on behalf of the heirs. Herrera, 565 P.2d at 482; 
Kynaston, 717 F.2d at 510. In contrast, the cause of action for 
wrongful death belongs to the heirs, not to the estate. Kynaston, 
717 F.2d at 509; Herrera, 565 P.2d at 482. It must be brought by 
the heirs, or by the decedent's personal representative "for the 
benefit of his heirs". U.C.A. §78-11-7. 
C. Kip Quinn filed a survival claim. 
In light of the foregoing basic differences between survival 
and wrongful death claims, the first sentence of Kip Quinn's Claim 
takes on great significance: 
Claim -'s hereby made against the Estate of Fenton G. Quinn by 
Kip Quinn, personal representative of Dawna W. Quinn, for and 
on behalf of the Estate of said Dawna W. Quinn for personal 
injury. 
Appendix A (emphasis added) 
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The sentence just quoted states a claim for survival of the 
decedentfs personal injury claims, not for wrongful death. 
Kynaston, 717 F.2d at 509-511; Herrera, 565 P.2d at 482. 
The second sentence of the Claim reads as follows: 
The basis of this Claim is that on or about May 24, 1984, 
Fenton G. Quinn caused the death of Dawna W. Quinn and that 
said action was done in a willful and malicious manner with 
the premeditated attempt to cause the death of Dawna W. Quinn. 
This second sentence is consistent with the first. Willful 
and malicious acts which cause personal injury resulting in death 
are the basis of survival actions under U.C.A. §78-11-12. Id. 
Thp third sentence places a value of $650,000 on the Claim. 
This might be considered too high for a survival claim. However, 
it must be kept in mind that survival claims for malicious torts 
(like tort actions generally), are unliquidated claims of 
uncertain value. The value of a tort claim depends on many 
factors, including subjective experience, the possibility of 
punitive damages, and others. The Claim filed by Kip Quinn 
tacitly acknowledged this uncertainty by tentatively assigning a 
value of "$650,000.00 or such other amount as may be determined." 
The Claim, as any other written document, must be construed 
in accordance with the ordinary and usual meaning of the words 
used. Pugh v. Stockdale and Co., 570 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1977). The 
Court is not at liberty to rewrite the Claim in order to preserve 
a cause of action for Respondents against the Estate. 
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 
(Utah 1982). 
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Finally, in construing Kio Quinn's Claim, it must be 
remembered that Plaintiffs were at liberty to draft the Claim in 
any way they saw fit. They had three months in which to file a 
claim or claims. During that time, they had amole opportunity to 
become familiar with the essential elements of a claim for 
wrongful death and a survival claim. Those elements are 
well-established in statute and case law. If the Claim stated a 
claim different from what Plaintiffs intended, they have only 
themselves to blame. To the extent the Claim is uncertain or 
ambiguous, it must be construed against the drafter. Wells Fargo 
Bank v. Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc., 544 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975). 
IV. SINCE NO VALID CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DEATH WAS FILED, THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED BELOW MUST BE MODIFIED OR REVERSED. 
A. The Judgment entered below included substantial damages 
for wrongful death. 
As discussed above, Kip Quinn's Claim was a survival claim. 
However, Plaintiffs1 Complaint in District Court was for survival 
and wrongful death. The Judgment entered below included 
substantial wrongful death damages. (R. at 365-66; see copy of 
Judgment in Addendum). 
Damages available in a survival claim are limited to those 
the injured party might have recovered had he o^ she lived. 
Kynaston, 717 F.2d at 511. Such damages would include loss of 
wages and medical expenses suffered from the time of injury to the 
time of death as well as funeral expenses. Daniels, "A Primer on 
Damages Under the Utah Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes", 19 74 
Utah Law Review, 519, 527 (hereinafter "Primer on Damages"). 
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In contrast, the decedent's heirs in a wrongful death action 
can recover not only their economic losses, such as loss of 
support and loss of inheritance, but also their non-economic loss, 
such as the loss of comfort, society, love, companionship, advice, 
and protection. "Primer on Damages" at 526; Jones v. Carvell, 641 
P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1982). 
The judgment entered below included substantial recoveries 
for elements of damages available only in a wrongful death claim 
(R. at 365-66; see also Jury Instructions, R. at 267, 268, 272). 
Since Plaintiffs never filed a valid claim for wrongful death, 
those recoveries must be vacated. 
B. No Recovery Can be Allowed on a Cause of Action 
Substantially Different from that Alleged in the Claim. 
A plaintiff cannot file one claim and then recover upon 
another. Banc. Prob. Prac, Section 901. In Ziegler v. Kramer, 
573 P.2d 644 (Mont. 1978), plaintiff made a claim against 
decedent's estate for indebtedness for services rendered to the 
decedent. 573 P.2d at 644. The claim was denied. After 
initiating a law suit and conducting discovery, plaintiffs sought 
to amend their complaint to add a theory of recovery under gift 
causa mortis. Ld. at 645. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed 
the District Court's denial of plaintiff's motion, explaining as 
follows: 
The four months' statute of limitation in Section 91-A-3-803 
was enacted to expedite the closing of decedents' estates. 
The claims sued upon the District court must be within the 
scope of the claim presented to the executor. 
Id. at 646 (emphasis added). 
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In Brown v . M i d l a n d n a t i o n a l S a n k , 435 P. 2d 879 (Mon t . 1 Q ^ ) , 
t h e c l a i m was for d e b t , bu t t h e s u i t f i l e d on t h e c l a i m a l l e g e d an 
o r a l c o n t r a c t t o b e q u e a t h n r n n p r t - " M-1 I'MMH d i s m i s s e d IMH 
l a w s u i t , h o l d i n g a s t o L l o w s : 
From th e ab ov e au t h o r it ies i t is a p pare n t t h a t t h e t e st of 
whether a variance between a creditor's claim and a 
subsequent suit is material and fatal is whether or r lot the 
claim sued upon is withi n the scope of the claim presented to 
the executor. Looking at the facts of the instant case we 
find that the variance consists of a creditor's claim 
grounded in. debt, and a. suit based upon breach of an oral 
contact to bequeath the amount set forth in the creditor's 
claim. 'In our v:ew, an action for breach of contract to 
bequeath :~ J ^ t ^ r i a l departure from a creditor's claim to 
recover a deot . . . . On] y in the broad sense that both seek 
recovery of the same amount of money can the instant suit be 
said to be with.-. ~he scope of the creditor's claim.. We deem 
this insufficient as the basic theory of recovery in the 
creditor " s claim is entirely d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t i n t h e s u. i t. 
4 3r» P. 2d at -— , s a d d e d ) ; Accord, Br ion v. Brown, 340 P. 2d 
5 3 9 (Mont. [ ^  ^ - and Neel v. Barnard, 1 50 P. 2 d ] 7 7 ( Ca ] 1 9 4 4 ) ; 
Banc. ?rob. Prdc. ^ ° M 1 . 
T he r e a ^'r * -: o vv n , q u u t e d a 1") ove , applies d i ** e c t "i v i ^  *- u * 
case now on aocpa;, * o Quinn's Claim on behalf of tin- Fstate >r 
personal iniurips leading to th^ death of -*-••- --, -H1 xs ent ' * • 
d i f f e r ^fif ! ( \ M I " j l M I M ; r on•": - . - ; t • ^n K ^  a 1 '" > * 
the heirs i to recover their losses result'no rrom "^  ;* * ?•. 
death. For this reason, there is a fatal var n^~<=> ^<=>tw°en t^e 
f h l IT! J \\ i J t I M i 11 ' i i I 11" t | n 11
 ( i 111 \ I h t- r H f (i r *' ~* . • - •' 4 t i o n 
should have been dismissed and the Judgment entered below must ^ e 
reversed. 
- 1 9 -
:ONCLUSION 
For all the reasons stated hereinabove, Appellants 
respectfully request the Court to modify the Judgment entered 
below by vacating the awards for wrongful death damages; or, in 
the alternative, to vacate the Judgment and remand with 
instructions to the District Court to dimiss with prejudice 
Respondents1 Claim for wrongful death and retry the case on 
Respondents1 survival claim. 
hi 
DATED this day of September, 1987. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
B. Kent Ludlow 
Chris L. Schmutz 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Appellants1 
Brief by hand delivering four (4) copies thereof to Robert Felton 
and George H. Speciale, attorneys for Respondents^ 5 Triad Center 
Suite 585, Salt Lake City, Utah 84180, this 
1987. 
day of September, 
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ll)-",imi PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 
action accruing at or after death of per- auainst estate claim antedating dece-
son in whose favor it would have accrue- -u-^r'< death, 1.46 A. L. R0 1179. 
28 A. L. R. 3d 1141. ^-laim statute as governing claim 
Direction in will for payment of deb to i-aia-d, subsequent to death of obligor, 
of testator, or for payment of specified by general statute of limitations, 112 A. 
debt? as affecting debts or debt barred L. R, 289, 
by limitation, 109 A. L. R. 1440. Relation back of appointment of ad-
Effect of statement of claim against ministrator, running of statute of limi-
decedent's estate regarding debt appar- tations as affected by doctrine of, 3 
ently barred by tHe statute of limitations, A. L, R. 3d 1234. 
119 A. Lo R. 426. Waiver or tolling of statute of limita-
Estoppel by silence or other conduct tions by executor or administrator 8 A, 
(other than failure to file) to assei t I • R 2d 660, 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Claims barred by statute of limitations. statute of limitations was available al-
Under former section, an executor or though not pleaded. Fullerton v. Bailey, 
administrator could not waive or abandon 1 7 u - 85> 5 3 p- 1020J Clayton v. Din-
statute of limitations; nor could court, woodey, 33 U. 251, 93 P. 723, 14 Ann. 
in passing upon claim of a decedent, Cas. 926; Hawkley v. Heaton, 54 U. 314, 
approve one against which statute had 1 8 0 p - 440J Gulbranson v. Thompson, 
run; therefore, where evidence showed 63 U. 115, 222 P. 590; Holloway v. Wet-
that claim was barred, it could not be zel, 86 U. 387, 45 P. 2d 565; Gray Realty 
allowed although administrator did not Co. v. Robinson, 111 U. 521, 184 P. 2d 
plead statute of limitation; defense of ^37 
75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims.—(1) All claims 
against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent, 
including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether due or to 
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded 
on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other stat-
ute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal representa-
+ ;,v ., .(j t j l e h -^j.y a n ( j devisees of the decedent, unless presented as fol-
ia - \hiii three months after the date of the first publication of no-
tice to creditors if notice is given in compliance with section 75-3-801; 
provided, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's domi-
cile before the first publication for claims in this state are also barred 
in this state, 
(b) Within three years at'let" I hi? \U n't-tlt-hl ? It.ilh, A notice lo 
-^editors has not been published. 
• All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the 
. of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision 
i,f /,. whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated 
or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred 
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and dev-
of the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
) A claim based on a contract with the personal representative, 
within three months after performance by the personal representative 
is due: 
(b) Any other claim, within three months after it arises, 
(3) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
188 
CREDITORS'' CLAIMS 75-3-803 
(a) Any proceeding to enforee any :r• ortprage. r; 1M r <\ or -. < h«-r !:» • 
upon property of the estate; or 
(b) To the limits of the insuiaju.e piuitt: < r . dig 
to establish liability of the decedent or the, pt •-. for 
which he is protected by liability insurance 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-803, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §4 
Editorial Board Comment 
There was some disagreement among 
the reporters over whether a short pe-
riod of l i m i t a t i o n s , or of nonclaim, 
should be provided for claims arising at 
or after death. Subsection (2) was finally 
inserted because most felt it was de-
sirable to accelerate the time when un-
adjudicated distributions would be final. 
The time limits stated would not, of 
course, affect any personal liability in 
contract, tort, or by statute, of the per-
sonal representative. Under section 75-
3-808 a personal representative is not 
liable on transactions entered into on 
behalf of the estate unless he agrees to 
be personally liable or unless he breaches 
a duty by making the contract. Creditors 
of the estate and not of the personal 
representative thus face a special limita-
tion that runs four months after per-
formance is due from the personal rep-
resentative. Tort claims normally will 
involve casualty insurance of the dece-
dent or of the personal representative, 
and so will fall within the exception of 
subsection (3). If a personal representa-
tive is personally at fault in respect to 
a tort claim arising after the decedent's 
death, his personal liability would not be 
affected by the running of the special 
short period provided here. 
The limitation stated in subdivision 
(l)(b) dovetails with the three-year 
limitation provided in section 75-3-108 
to eliminate most questions of succession 
that are controlled by state law after 
three years from death have elapsed. 
Questions of interpretation of any will 
probated within such period, or of the 
identity of heirs in intestacy are not 
barred, however* 
Cross-References. 
Where party dies after verdict or de-
cision and before judgment, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 58A (d). 
Collateral References. 
Executors and Administrators<§=3225. 
34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators 
§§ 405-408. 
31 Am. Jur. 2d 148, Executors and 
Administrators § 291. 
Action on contingent claim., presen-
tation ol .(aim a., /^i.vixijwij
 t , n^J* . . 
:U A. L R. 372. 
Amendment of claim against dece-
dent's estate after expiration of time for 
filing claims, 56 A. L. R. 2d 627. 
•licability of nonclaim statute to 
arising under contract executory 
ie of death, 47 A. L. R. 896. 
}'>- of statute of nonclaim of dece 
dent's domicile as affecting assertion of 
claim elsewhere, 72 A. L. R. 1030. 
Claims for taxes as within contempla-
tion of statute requiring presentation of 
claims against decedents' estates, 109 
A. L. R. 1370. 
Condition precedent to suit for spe-
cific performance of contract to make 
will in favor of another or to will latter 
a specified sum or property, presentation 
of claim against decedent's estate as, 113 
A. L. R. 1070. 
Counterclaim or setoff, presentation of 
claim to executor or administrator as 
prerequisite of its availability as, 36 
A. L. R. 3d 693. 
Delay in appointing administrator or 
other representative, effect on cause of 
action accruing at or after death of 
person in whose favor it would have 
accrued, 28 A. L. R. 3d 1141. 
Effect of recovery of judgment on un 
filed or abandoned claim after expiration 
of time allowed for filing claim against 
estate, 60 Ac L. R. 736. 
P Iling claim against estate of decedent 
as affecting or precluding other remedies 
against estate, 120 A. L. R. 1225. 
Funeral expenses, presentation of claim 
for to executor or administrator, 34 A. L, 
R. 375, 120 A. L. R. 275. 
Government: claim of government or 
subdivision thereof as within provision 
of nonclaim statute, 34 A. L. R. 2d 1003. 
Guaranty, suretyship, or endorsement, 
claim on decedent's contract of, as con-
tingent, 94 A. L. R. 1155. 
Judgment lien, presentation of claim 
against deceased debtor's estate as con-
dition of action to enforce, 114 A L. R 
1167. 
Land contract, application of non-
claim statute to claim for unmatured 
payments under, 99 A, L. R. 2d 275. 
Limitations, effect of statement ^ of 
claim against decedent's estate setting 
out debt apparently barred by statute of, 
119 A, L. R. 426. 
189 
75-3-804 PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 
Where claims were barred for failure fense of general statute of limitations 
to file on time, administratrix was with- available to administratrix in action by 
out power to pay them, and any money creditor. Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 
paid thereon would be considered to come 111 U. 521, 184 P. 2d 237. 
from her personal funds, and could not Statute requiring presentation of 
be considered as deduction from inberi- claims within time stated in notice was 
tance tax. Jones v. State Tax Comm., not a bar to action to impress judgment 
99 U. 373, 104 P. 2d 210. lien on property, where complaint alleged 
Claims had to be filed, after proper no- that property had been transferred to 
tice, within time limit of statute, or be defraud creditors, and that property was 
forever barred. Jones v. State Tax held in trust for defendant. Moulton v. 
Comm., 99 U. 373, 104 P. 2d 210. Morgan, 115 U. 119, 202 P. 2d 723. 
Purpose of statute requiring presenta- . 
tion of claims within time stated in notice Time limitations. 
was to require publication of notice to Demand against decedent's estate as-
creditors so as to shorten limitation pe- serting that property was sold to claim-
riod, and not to lengthen it because of ant by deceased and asking the court to 
neglect on part of personal representa- order the administrator to make a suita-
tive or delay on part of creditor. Gray ble conveyance was a petition for spe-
Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 U. 521, 184 cific performance of a contract to convey 
P. 2d 237. property and was not subject to the one-
Notice to creditors by administratrix, year time limitation for presenting 
indicating that claims against estate claims against an estate. In re Estate of 
could be filed before certain date, did not Sharp, 537 P. 2d 1034. 
constitute waiver or abandonment of de-
75-3-804. Manner of presentation of claims.—(1) Claims against a 
decedent's estate may be presented as follows: 
(a) The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative 
a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and 
address of the claimant, and the amount claimed, or may file a written 
statement of the claim, in the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk 
of the court. The claim is deemed presented on the first to occur of re-
ceipt of the written statement of claim by the personal representative, 
or the filing of the claim with the court. If a claim is not yet due, the 
date when it will become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent 
or unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty shall be stated. If the 
claim is secured, the security shall be described. Failure to describe cor-
rectly the security, the nature of any uncertainty, and the due date of a 
claim not yet due does not invalidate the presentation made. 
(b) The claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal 
representative in any court where the personal representative may be 
subjected to jurisdiction to obtain payment of his claim against the es-
tate, but the commencement of the proceeding must occur within the 
time limited for presenting the claim. No presentation of claim is re-
quired in regard to matters claimed in proceedings against the decedent 
which were pending at the time of his death. 
(2) If a claim is presented under subsection (1) (a) above, no pro-
ceeding thereon may be commenced more than 60 days after the per-
sonal representative has mailed a notice of disallowance; but, in the 
case of a claim which is not presently due or which is contingent or 
unliquidated, the personal representative may consent to an extension 
of the 60-day period, or to avoid injustice the court, on petition, may 
order an extension of the 60-day period, but in no event shall the exten-
sion run beyond the applicable statute of limitations. 
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ACTIONS - RIGHT TO SUE 78-11-7 
Right of tortfeasor to contribution from joint 
tortfeasor who is spouse or otherwise in close 
familial relationship to injured party, 25 
A.L.R.4th 1120. 
Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive 
damages awarded in personal injury or death 
cases, generally, 35 A.L.R.4th 441. 
Child's death, damages for grief or mental 
anguish, 45 A.L.R.4th 234. 
Products liability: construction materials or 
insulation containing formaldehyde, 45 
A.L.R.4th 751. 
Products liability: liability of manufacturer 
or seller as affected by failure of subsequent 
party in distribution chain to remedy or warn 
against defect of which he knew, 45 A.L.R.4th 
777. 
Recoverability from tortfeasor of cost of diag-
nostic examinations absent proof of actual bod-
ily injury, 46 A.L.R.4th 1151. 
Personal injury or property damage caused 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-11-7. 
Cross-References. — Comparative negli-
gence, § 78-27-38. 
Evidence required for recovery, §§ 78-11-12, 
78-11-13. 
Payment of medical and similar expenses 
not admission of liability, Rule 409, U.R.E. 
by lightning as basis of tort liability, 46 
A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Strict liability of landlord for injury or death 
of tenant or third person caused by defect in 
premises leased for residential use, 48 
A.L.R.4th 638. 
Excessiveness and adequacy of damages for 
personal injuries resulting in death of minor, 
49 A.L.ii.4th 1076. 
What constitutes impairment of proposed in-
tervener's interest to support intervention as 
matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in personal injury and 
death actions, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 174. 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to li-
ability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions involv-
ing personal injury, death, or property damage, 
78 A.L.R. Fed. 890. 
Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime nature of 
tort — modern cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 105. 
Key Numbers. — Parent and Child «=> 7(6). 
Right to recover damages for death gener-
ally, Utah Const., Art. XVI, Sec. 5. 
Statute of limitations, wrongful death, 
§ 78-12-28. 
Survival of cause of action, §§ 78-11-12, 
78-11-13. 
78-11-7, Death of adult — Suit by heir or personal repre-
sentative. 
Except as provided in Chapter 1, of Title 35, when the death of a person not 
a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, or his 
personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may maintain an action 
for damages against the person causing the death, or, if such person is em-
ployed by another person who is responsible for his conduct, then also against 
such other person. If such adult person has a guardian at the time of his 
death, only one action can be maintained for the injury to or death of such 
person, and such action may be brought by either the personal representatives 
of such adult deceased person, for the benefit of his heirs, or by such guardian 
for the benefit of the heirs as provided in the next preceding section 
[§ 78-11-6]. In every action under this and the next preceding section 
[§ 78-11-6] such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the 
case may be just. 
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78-11-11 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-11-11. Submitting controversy without action. 
Parties to a question in difference, which might be the subject of a civil 
action, may without action agree upon a case containing the facts upon which 
the controversy depends, and present a submission of the same to any court 
which would have jurisdiction if an action had been brought. But it must 
appear by affidavit that the controversy is real, and that the proceeding is in 
good faith, to determine the rights of the parties. The court must thereupon 
hear and determine the case and render judgment thereon as if an action were 
pending. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-11-17. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agreed Case Key Numbers. — Submission of Contro-
ls 1 et seq. versy «=> 1 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 83 C.J.S. Submission of Contro-
versy § 1 et seq. 
78-11-12. Survival of action for injury to person or death 
upon death of wrongdoer or injured person — 
Exception and restriction to out-of-pocket ex-
penses. 
Causes of action arising out of physical injury to the person or death, caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, shall not abate upon the death of 
the wrongdoer or the injured person, and the injured person or the personal 
representatives or heirs of one meeting death, as above stated, shall have a 
cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the 
wrongdoer for special and general damages. However, if prior to judgment or 
settlement, the injured person dies as a result of some cause other than the 
injury received as a result of the wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, 
the personal representatives or heirs of that person shall be entitled to receive 
no more than the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of that 
injured person as the result of his injury. In either event, neither the injured 
person nor the personal representatives or heirs of one meeting death shall 
recover judgment except upon some competent satisfactory evidence other 
than the testimony of that injured person. 
History: L. 1953, ch. 30, § 1; 1967, ch. 217, Statute of limitations, wrongful death, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 139, § 1. § 78-12-28. 
Cross-References. — Death of person enti- Wrongful death actions, Utah Const., Art. 
tied to sue, effect on statute of limitations, XVI Sec 5" §§ 78-11-6 78-11-7 
§§ 78-12-37, 78-12-38. 
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